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GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS 
Heidi J.S. Tworek and Richard R. John 
The harnessing of steam and electricity in the mid-nineteenth century created a new world of 
possibilities in business, politics, and public life. In no realm was this transformation more 
momentous than in communications, an activity commonly understood at this time to embrace 
not only the trans-local circtilation of information, but also the long-distance transportation of 
people and goods (Matterlart 1996, 2000). For the first time in world history, merchants could 
convey overseas large quantities of goods on a regular schedule and exchange information at a 
speed greater than a ship could sail. New organizations sprang up to take advantage of this 
"communications revolution," as this transformation has come to be known (John 1994). Some 
were public agencies; others were private firms. Each was shaped not only by the harnessing of 
new energy sources, but also by the institutional rules of the game. These rules defined the 
relationship of the state and the market, or what economic historians call the political 
economy. 
This chapter surveys this transformation, which we have come to view with fresh eyes fol-
lowing the commercialization of the Intern~t in the 1990s. It features case studies of two well-
documented global communications organizations that originated in the nineteenth century 
- undersea cable companies and news agencies - which we have supplemented by a brief discus-
sion of other important global communications organizations: radio, telephony, and the mail. 
We have not surveyed film, a topic addressed by Peter Miskell's chapter in this Handbook. 
Four premises shape our chapter. First, the makers of global communications are best char-
acterized as organizations rather than private .firms or public agencies. They have sometimes been 
government owned and government operated and, especially recently, are often coordinated by 
ostensibly nonprofit and non-governmental technical bodies such as the Internet Corporation 
for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) (Mackinnon 2012; DeNardis 2014). Many are 
multinational enterprises (MNEs), making this topic particularly pertinent for historians inter-
ested in the relationship between international business, technology, and the state. 
Second, the organizations that the makers of global communications established are most 
aptly characterized as networks that consisted of links, nodes, and spaces-in-between, rather than 
as more-or-less seamless systems. All metaphors raise interpretative issues, and network is no 
exception (Marx 1994: 21-25). Yet networks are explicitly spatial, in contrast to systems, and, for 
this reason, better describe organizations that are entwined with sovereign states, technical 
standard-setting bodies, and multinational enterprises. In rejecting the system metaphor, we 
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break with much innovative recent scholarship on long-distance communications, which has 
posited that the leading organizations are best understood as components of a "large technical 
system," a concept popularized by historian of technology Thomas P. Hughes (1998, 2005). 
While this construct has the advantage of shifting attention away from the internal dynamics of 
particular firms, it presupposes a spatial uniformity that is hard to square with the historical 
record. 
Our third premise is that the most influential makers of global communications were not 
confined to the ranks of visionary entrepreneurs or venture capitalists. Rather, they also included 
the political economy that facilitated- or in the case of the Soviet Union, stymied (Peters 2016) 
- the innovative process. Every political economy has a distinctive structure. And in global 
communications, as in so many other realms, structure shaped strategy: that is, the political strudure 
that incubated global communications organizations shaped the management strategies of private.firms, the 
administrative mandates of public agencies, and the technical directives of standard-setting bodies. 
Our final premise is that the present is not the first historical epoch in which enormous tech-
nical advances in communications technology have reshaped the world economy, recalibrated 
perceptual horizons, and reordered conventional assumptions about time, space, and speed. On 
the contrary, the foundations of the present digital age were laid in a mid-nineteenth-century 
communications revolution that transformed the informational environment long before the 
laying of the first fiber optical cable Oohn 2000; Rosenberg 2012, Osterhammel 2014; Balbi and 
John 2015). The dominant organizations that this revolution spawned were not only or even 
primarily the byproducts of technical imperatives and economic incentives. On the contrary, 
they benefitted from institutional arrangements designed to promote political goals. In com-
munications, probably more than in any other realm but national defense, governments have 
played favorites - hence why a small number of huge organizations with dose ties to the state 
dominated the informational environment of modernity. 
In the opening years of the twentieth century, German publi<;ations buzzed with excited reflec-
tions on a new concept: "the world economy" (Weltwirtscheft). New concepts are often devised 
to describe innovations in material life and this coinage was no exception. Weltwirtscheft received 
much of its plausibility from its association with "world traffic" ( Weltverkehr), a related concept 
that described the circulation ofinformation, people, and goods in commerce, communications, 
and transportation (Tworek 2015a). References to Weltverkehrbecame increasingly common in 
Germany in the decades following national unification in 1871, when the country emerged for 
the first time as a global economic powerhouse. This new way of thinking about business and 
technology would become so common by 1912 that a group of German academics established 
a journal entitled Weltverkehr und Weltwirtscheft. 
But just how large was the world that these Germans imagined? To answer this question, 
postal administrator Max Roscher distinguished in 1914 between traffic that was merely national 
or international and traffic that was truly worldwide. Traffic linking neighboring countries such 
as Germany and France was international, but not global. Weltverkchr, by contrast, referred to 
"trade relationships encircling the whole world between areas ... that lie far apart" (Roscher 
1914; 305, translated by the authors). 
This chapter follows Roscher's lead by surveying historical scholarship on organizatioru that 
coordinated the movement ofinformation. people. and goods between di3tant region3 that were 
often Jeparated by 3ca. The3e organizations relied upon two new energy sources: electricity, the 
circulating medium for the world's cable and telegraph networks; and ste:im, !l motive power 
indispensable for overseas shipping. The first regularly scheduled steamship service between 
Great Britain and the United States went into operation in 1840. Before long, lteamshipJ would 
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link mo~t of the world's major pom (the mbject of Harlafris's chapter in this Handbook). The 
influence of steam and electricity upon commerce, politics, and the economy in the nineteenth 
century was ··!lstounding," reflected a New York City-based wholesale merchant in 1875: 
Now, the whole world has become producers or mders, and in the event of scarcity 
at a given place, the news is flashed to the point of supply - under the ocean and 
around the earth even - and the giant power of steam hurriC3 the products of the world 
to our doors. 
(Thurber 1875: 623) 
The symbiotic relationship between innovations in communications and ocean-home trans-
portation has persisted to the present. In the early twentieth century, for example, private firms 
mch as the U.S.-bMed United Fruit Company joined public agencies such as the British admi-
ralty and U.S. Navy as early adopters of wireless telegraphy, or what we today call point-to-
point radio (Hugill 1999; Winkler 2008). Following World War II, further innovations in 
infonnation technology would transform supply-chain logistics in overseas trade (Levinson 
2006; Miller 2012). 
The transformations set in motion by steam and electricity hastened a new sensibility that can 
be properly called global, in the sense that they encouraged new and often highly expansive 
ways of thinking about knowledge, territoriality, and power. French scientists devised a new 
cosmology to describe a world in which steam power and the electric telegraph supplanted the 
clock as a metaphor for the natural order (Tresch 2012); American liberals linked technological 
innovation in transportation and communications with a more spatially expansive conception of 
moral progress (Ninkovich 2009); while British and American commentators invoked organic 
metaphors such as "nerves" and the global "body" to link the telegraph and cable with imperial 
projects and territorial expansion (Bell 2007; Otis 2011). 
For the vMt majority of the world's inhabitants, the most important long-distance commu-
nications network until quite recently WM not the telegraph or the telephone, but the mail. The 
world's postal network expanded enormously in the nineteenth century, partly because of 
the widespread adoption of the steamship as a mode of transportation, and partly because of the 
e5tablishment of an international organization - the Universal Postal Union - to coordinate the 
transnational movement of the mail {Hyde 1975; Laborie 2010; John 2015; Shulman 2015). 
Merchants relied on the mail to conduct routine business. Migrants used it to remain in touch 
with friends and family members back home (Gerber 2006; Laako 2007; Maischak 2013). The 
mill - and not the telegraph, M a journalist erroneously contended in a popular history written 
shortly after the commercialization of the Internet in 1995 (Standage 1998) - was the true 
"Victorian internet" Oohn 2010, 2013). 
Until quite recently, all of the world's major postal systems were owned and operated by 
national governments and operated as monopolies, an uncomfortable fact for neoliberal 
champions of economic development, since the mail has long been an indispensable agent of 
globalization. Steamships remained the primary mode of long-distance postal conveyance 
until the mid-twentieth century, when they would be supplemented, and eventually largely 
replaced, by airplanes, the primary mode oflong-distance postal conveyance today. Most of 
the organizations that conveyed the ~ail - from the Cunard Company in the mid-nineteenth 
century to Pan American Airlines in the 1930s - were not public agencies, but private firms. 
Even so, these companies relied on substantial government subsidies, particularly early on. 
Predictably, they quickly became oligopolies, which they largely remain today (Robinson 
1964; Linden 2001). 
317 
Heidi f.S. Tworek and Richard R. John 
By almost any measure, the mail remained the primary long-distance communicatiom 
medium for almost everyone from the nineteenth century until the commercialization of the 
Internet in the 1990s. This included not only migrants eager to remain in touch with friends and 
family members back home, but also MNEs such as the Ford Motor Company, whose far-flung 
managers routinely relied on the mail to conduct routine business (Wilkins and Hill 1964). For 
certain groups of highly specialized users, however, the mail was supplemented - and partly 
supplanted - by a constellation of electrically mediated long-distance communications media: 
first the cable (or undersea telegraph), then wireless tele~phy (or what would come to be. 
known as point-to-point radio), and eventually the telephone and the fax (Coopersmith 
2015). 
The electric telegraph was not the first long-distance communications medium to transmit 
information faster than a horse could gallop (Headrick 2000). That distinction goes to the 
optical telegraph, which, along with the guillotine and the metric system, deserves pride of place 
as one of the most fundamental of the technical advances to have emerged from the French 
Revolution. It was this innovation that gave the world the term "telegraph," a French neolo-
gism meaning, literally, writing at a distance. The French government owned and operated the 
most important optical telegraph. In its heyday in the early 1850s, it linked 556 towers in a· 
network that extended over 2,900 miles. Except briefly during the Napoleonic era, this network 
did not operate outside France's borders Oohn 2010). 
The first medium to transmit electrically mediated information over long distances between 
countries that lacked a common border was the undersea (or "submarine") cable. Undersea 
cables were almost always owned and operated as private firms, though they depended on the 
governments of the countries they linked for various privileges, particularly landing righa 
(Miiller 2016). 
Cable companies operated closely with country-specific land-line (or "inland'') telegraph 
networks that were often government owned and government operated. Important exceptions 
(and there are others) included the British inland telegraph network before 1870 and the U.S. 
land-line telegraph network during its entire history. The cable network expanded rapidly: the 
English Channel was spanned in 1851; the Atlantic in 1866; and the Pacific in 1902. By 1879, 
around 100,000 miles of undersea cables had been laid. This total nearly doubled to 190,000 
miles by 1900, when a wire network linked every continent other than Antarctica (Miiller 
2016: 227). 
Historical writing on undersea cables is highly developed and fills into three main traditions. 
The first tradition highlights the close relationship between the cable network and the imperial 
designs of the European Great Powers, particularly Great Britain (Innis 1950; Headrick 1991; 
Hugill 1999; Headrick and Griset 2001; Wenzlhuemer 2013). The cable network, Daniel R. 
Headrick famously posited in 1991, was an "invisible weapon" that the British government 
deployed to maintain control over its sprawling imperial domain. The second tradition contends 
that the focus on imperial designs is often exaggerated (especially before 1890) and emphasizes 
the business strategy of individual cable companies and the economic benefits of oligopolistic 
collusion (Winseck and Pike 2007). The third tradition, and the one most aligned with thll 
chapter's perspective (Millier and Tworek 2015; Miiller 2016), shifts the focus to political 
economy, and, in particular, to the institutional rules of the game in which the global cable 
network evolved. This tradition has been shaped by the recent emergence of global history as a 
discrete field of inquiry. By decentcring both the nation-ltatc and the firm, it has shifted our 
attention to the network as the primary unit of analysis (Grewal 2008; Conrad 2016). 
Though cable companies barely figure in standard accounts of large-scale enterprise, they 
share many features that historians associate with the rise of mamgeri!\l capitalism (Chandler 
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1977). C:ipit!tl-intensive and technically advanced, they were operated by an elite cadre of 
engineers who did much to invent the modem field of electrical engineering (Hunt 1997). The 
mo~t important cable companies were headqu:irtered in London, where a cohort oflike-minded 
Anglo-American promoteo, investor:i. and engineers - the "cl:iss of 1866" (Milller 2016) -
overuw the construction and operation of the global cable network during its heyd:iy, which 
stretched from 1866 until World War I. Prominent among them was Cylli3 Field, an Arµerican 
paper manufacturer who helped fund :in unsuccessful 1858 Atlantic cable, and John Pender. a 
British textile manufacturer who invested he:ivily in the 1866 successful Atlantic cable, as well 
as the various telegraph companies linking the United Kingdom with its colonial possessions in 
South Asia. Though U.S.-based companies would contest the domin:ince ofBritish firms in the 
North Atlantic market, only the British had the know-how, the natural resources, and the 
equipment to operate and maintain a global network (Winkler 2008). And since the fastest and 
most widely used North Atlantic cables all touched on British or Canadian soil, the British gov-
ernment retained the ability to monitor cable traffic to and from the United States, an afford:ince 
that would prove useful during World War I. 
One of the most vital natural resources upon which cable promoters relied was gutta 
percha, a tree-based resin from Malaya that, beginning in the 1850s, cable manufacturers 
relied on to insulate undersea cables. British imperial control over much of Southeast Asia 
helped to guarantee British cable manufacturers cheap and reliable access to this indispensable 
raw material. By the early twentieth century, so much gutta percha had been extracted from 
the rain forests of the region that they had been stripped bare, creating a "Victorian ecological 
disaster" (Tully 2009). 
The cable network was dominated by a small number of capital-intensive organizations that 
nineteenth-century economists dubbed "natural" monopolies (Mosca 2008; Wagner 2014). 
The huge sunk (literally!) costs oflaying telegraph cables created formidable barriers to entry, as 
did the restrictions governments imposed on the granting of landing rights. The New York, 
Newfoundland and London Telegraph Company, for example, obtained from the Newfound-
land government a fifty-year exclusive monopoly on cable landings in 1854, an enormously 
valuable asset, given the strategic location of Newfoundland in the North Atlantic market 
(Miiller 2016). 
Three business groups dominated the global cable network in its heyday: the Atlantic pool, 
the Eastern and Associated Companies, and a constellation of firms whose interests were often 
aligned with the Great Northern Telegraph Company. The Atlantic pool was dominant in the 
lucrative North Atlantic market. Led by the British-owned and British-operated Atlantic Tele-
graph Company - the firm that had laid the first successful Atlantic cable in 1866 - this pool was 
challenged in the 1880s by a number of rivals, including two based in the United States. Fol-
lowing a brief price war, the main players agreed to divide the market. By 1900, the thirteen 
cables that spanned the North Atlantic were owned and operated by a mere four companies, 
with a capitalization that was estimated to top £17 million, making them among the world's 
largest multinationals. Together, they sent around 10,000 messages each d:iy between Europe 
and North America, in what was and would remain the single largest cable market in the world 
(Miiller and Tworek 2015: 265). 
The second group was the Eastern and Associated Telegraph Companies, a federation of 
British-owned and British-operated firms that controlled the cable network between Great 
Britain, its vast colonial empire, and much of the rest of the world. The most important cables 
in this group linked Great Britain, India, China, and Australasia; additional cables linked Great 
Britain to Central and South America (Brown 1927: 11-19). In 1898, this group owned and 
operated one-third of the world's total global cable mileage and transmitted two million messages 
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(Bright 1902: 167). By 1914, it had become, in the words of Daniel R. Headrick, "one of the 
world's most powerful multi-national conglomerates" (1988: 105). 
The third group linked Europe with Asia and the United States with Latin America. While 
harder to characterize than the first two groups, it was dominated after 1869 by the Danish-
based Great Northern Telegraph Company, which combined the assets ofDanish, Norwegian, 
Russian, and English investors to link Europe with East Asia via the Baltic Sea by undersea cable 
and the vast Russian interior by land-line telegraph. Between 1871and1943, Great Northern 
partnered with a Japanese-based cable firm to boost East-West trade and reduce the cost of 
diplomatic dispatches (Xang 2010). Other cable companies linked the United States with Brazil 
and other South American countries by way of the West India and Panama Telegraph Company, 
the Brazilian Submarine Telegraph Company, and the Western and Brazilian Telegraph 
Company (Ahvenainen 2004; Britton 2013). 
The cable network shaped global business in various ways. Though it did not annihilate time 
and space, as some contemporaries claimed, it helped to standardize time zones (Ogle 2015) and 
expand the futures market, a new economic institution that was based on the buying and selling 
of agricultural commodities in time rather than space. The new medium, or so Karl Marx pre-
dicted in 1855, was rapidly "transforming" the "whole of Europe" into "one single stock 
exchange" (Marx 1855: 167). Marx was wrong. Regional markets persisted and, in some places, 
the creation of a futures markets predated the laying of the first undersea cable: in Japan, for 
example, a futures market dated back to the Dojima rice market in Osaka in the early seven-
teenth century (Schaede 1989). Yet it was only after the Atlantic cable had linked the United 
States and Europe that a large-scale futures market emerged in Chicago (Engel 2015). Cable 
telegraphy also enabled steamship lines to buy, sell, and move goods around the world, while 
reducing the time that fleets had to remain in port (Lew and Cater 2006). 
Undersea cables were most emphatically not the Victorian Internet (contra Standage 1998). 
Rates remained extremely high, and facilities limited. In the first several decades of the Atlantic 
cable, fewer than 100 businesses used it with any regulariry. In fact, the cost of sending a cable 
was so exorbitant that one British MP, Henniker Heaton, complained in 1912 that the new 
medium was "beyond the means of 99 percent of the population" (Millier 2015). Until the 
1890s, most cable investments strengthened pre-existing ties between major urban trading 
centers (Hoag 2006). Many parts of the world remained outside the network, an outcome ba5ed 
partly on prevailing assumptions about race, gender, and class. The vast majority of investors 
were men, though women would come to hold substantial shares in certain cable companies, 
just as they did in sailing vessels (Doe 2010; Muller 2016). 
The cable network changed significantly in the 1890s, partly as a result of Great Power 
competition between Great Britain, France, and Germany, and partly because of the height-
ened U.S. presence in the Pacific that followed the U.S. acquisition of the Philippines and 
Guam during the Spanish-American War. No longer could it plausibly be contended that 
cable companies operated more-or-less independently of political fiat, a contention that had 
been at least partly true before this time for certain markets outside South Asia and Africa 
(Headrick 1988: 100, 107). The German government subsidized German cable companies 
because officials feared that Anglo-American cable companies put Gernian firms at a dis-
advantage in international markets. The British government worked with its Canadian coun-
terparts to lay a trans-Pacific cable that, when it went into operation in 1902, completed a 
global "All-Red Route" that linked British imperial possessions by landing only on British-
controlled territory. And in 1903, the U.S. government provided technical assistance to 2 
U.S. Pacific cable project that provided a direct cable link to Hawaii. the Philippines. and 
Guam. Neither Pacific cable was an economic success. Then and now, politic3 ha5 it5 limit5: 
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though geopolitical rivalry hastened their completion, it could not conjure new markets into 
existence. Built ahead of demand, the Pacific cables never generated enough traffic to cover 
their huge sunk costs (Muller and Tworek 2015). 
An even more fundamental challenge to the cable network would emerge in 1901, when the 
British-Italian inventor-turned-promoter Guglielmo Marconi successfully demonstrated that he 
could transmit a point-to-point radio message across the Atlantic. The military and commercial 
significance of wireless telegraphy (as point-to-point radio transmission was then known) was 
self-evident to government officials in Great Britain, Germany, and the United States, setting in 
motion a global communications arms race that would ultimatdy have major implications not 
only for commerce, but also for geopolitics. To cement Marconi's dominant position in the 
wireless market, his company - Marconi Wireless - refused before 1912 to interconnect with 
rival wireless network providers, a business strategy that put Marconi at odds with government 
officials and rival network providers in the United States and Germany (Raboy 2016). The 
stakes were high: for the first time in world history, it was now possible for naval officers to 
maintain ship-to-shore contact with their fleets anywhere on the high seas, a logistical advantage 
that no great power could ignore. The geopolitical significance of technical advances such as 
wireless varied widely from nation to nation. For the British, as one historian has explained, 
technical advances helped "stabilize an international status quo" that was already "favorable to 
their nation"; for the Germans, in contrast, they could help "transform the international environ-
ment that stifled their political ambitions" by improving the position of German business and 
the German government in the global economy (Rieger 2005: 18). 
The German government fostered innovation in wireless by restructuring private enterprise. 
In 1903, for example, it convinced two competing electrical manufacturing companies -
Siemens & Halske and AEG - to form a jointly owned subsidiary known as Telefunken to 
undertake research and development in the mysterious new medium and manufucture wireless 
receivers. During the first eight years of its existence, Telefunken obtained between 70 percent 
and 80 percent of its revenue from government contracts. German officials were also active on 
the diplomatic front. Following an almost decade-long diplomatic standoff, German officials 
joined with British and U.S. officials in a 1912 international standard-setting meeting in London 
to force Marconi Wireless to make its receivers compatible with those of its rivals. 
Within two years, Telefunken and Marconi established a cartel in wireless equipment. To 
gain control of market for ship-to-shore communications, the two companies agreed to pool 
patents. Of the 1,554 ship-to-ship stations then in existence, only 294 remained outside their 
control (Evans 2010: 213). Taking to the offensive, German officials underwrote the establish-
ment of a global "All-Wireless Route" to link Germany and its colonies. Germany's defeat in 
World War I hastened the surrender of its wireless patents to the U.S. government, which trans-
ferred them to incumbent telephone network provider American Telephone & Telegraph 
(AT&T) and newly established radio equipment manufacturer Radio Corporation of America 
(RCA). These companies, in tum, would become major players in the U.S. radio broadcasting 
industry following its beginnings in 1920 (Aitken 1985). While Germany never regained its 
prewar position in wireless, it would remain a major player in the interwar period in broadcast 
radio (Tworek 2016). 
The slow yet steady ascendency of the United States in global communications during the 
interwar period created path dependencies that have lasted until today. Rising American influence 
was on display in 1927 when an international radio conference agreed to allocate the spectrum by 
function rather than nation, a victory for U.S. companies and a defeat for Great Britain, France, 
and the other European Great Powers (Schwoch 1987). International standard-setting has a polit-
ical dimension, as political theorist David Grewal has observed, since a successful standard can exert 
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"network power" by fostering cooperation among network members, excluding non-members, 
and convincing would-be members to join the network even though membership might in certain 
respects be disadvantageous (Grewal 2008: 10). Since 1927, this kind of power increasingly bene-
fitted the United States in its contest for global communications dominance first with Great Britain 
and, after 1945, the Soviet Union (Hills 2002, 2007). U.S. global communications policy has 
consistently favored private management over government administration. Since 1970, this pref-
erence has become increasingly influential in global communications with the deregulation of 
many of the world's largest state-owned telecommunications network providers (Fitzgerald 2015). 
For a brief period following World War II, it seemed conceivable that satellites might replace 
cables as the primary carrier of the world's global communications. Funded primarily by the 
United States and the Soviet Union, the first satellites - Sputnik for the Soviets; Comsat for 
the Americans - were players in a global Cold War (Schwoch 2009; Sletten 2013). Following 
the discovery of fiber optics, however, the balance has shifted back to undersea cables. As a con-
sequence, today's Internet network resembles the global cable network in 1902 far more than 
the satellite network in 1970 (Finn and Yang 2009; Starosielski 2015). Little wonder, then, that 
one leader of a developing country, Tanzanian president Jakaya Kikwete, characterized the 
laying in 2009 by a pan-African business consortium of the first fiber optic cable between East 
Asia and the Arabian Peninsula as "the ultimate embodiment of modernity" (cited in Milller and 
Tworek 2015: 282). 
While the cable network has long been hailed as a technological icon, the news agencies report-
ing international news for the world's newspapers, radio programs, and television broadcasts are 
largely unknown even to specialists in the field. This is unfortunate, since their history reveals 
much about the evolution of global communications following the harnessing of steam and 
electricity. 
Historical writing on international news agencies falls into two main categories: monographs 
on specific organizations and interpretative surveys. Organization-specific monographs are 
typically fact-laden and narrowly focused (Read 1992); interpretative surveys are more wide-
ranging and often emphasize the interconnected influence of politics, new media, and business 
competition (Rantanen 2013; Silberstein-Loeb 2014; John and Silberstein-Loeb 2015; Stamm 
2015; Shu 2016). 
News agencies can be thought of as brokers or wholesalers that relied on a network of cor-
respondents to generate news items in a specific territory that they repackaged as time-specific 
fillips of information for their "'retail' clients," which, in the late nineteenth century, were 
mostly newspapers (Boyd-Barrett and Rantanen 1998: 6). Of these newspapers, only the largest 
and best capitalized - e.g., the London Times and the New York Herald - could afford to hire 
their own international correspondents. As an alternative, many contracted with news agencies 
to send them up-to-date information via the mail, the telegraph, cable, and also, and in due 
time, the telegraph ticker, the telephone, and wireless. 
The most important nineteenth-century European news agencies were the "Big Three": 
Agence Havas, founded in the early 1830s; Wolff's Telegraphisches Bureau, or Wolff. founded 
in 1849; and Reuters, founded in 1851. Each was named after an eponymous founder: Charles-
Louis Havas, Bernhard Wolff, and Paul Reuter. Each relied on a far-flung staff of correspond-
ents to gather news for newspapers, which were at the time the primary distributot of 
time-specific information on commerce and public affairs. 
Their principal U.S. counterpart was the New York Associated Press (NYAP), which was 
founded in the mid-1840s, and the Western Associated Press (WAP), which was founded in 
1862. The WAP succeeded the NYAP as the dominant U.S. newsbroker in 1892, when it 
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ren:imed itself the Assocfated Press (AP) (Blondheim 1994). The news agency model proved 
highly successful. In the words ofBritishjournalistJohn Hobson, its ability to transmit real-time 
news to far-flung locations created an "immediate and simultaneous sympathy" that brought a 
"new clement of sociality" into the world. "In this sense," Hobson elaborated, "we may say that 
the world has been recently discovered for the mass of civilized mankind" (1906: 17). 
International news-gathering was, and is, expensive. To cover its cost, nineteenth-century 
news agencies relied on a far-flung network of overseas correspondents to report the news, and 
a global telegraph, telephone, and radio network to transmit it. On the eve of World War I, 
Wolff spent over $160,000 in news-gathering, while Reuters spent four to five times that much 
(Hansen 1914: 80). These were large sums for a time in which the capitalization of the then 
struggling London Times was a mere $2 million, the working capital of the entire Northcliffe 
newspaper empire no more than $8 million, and the financial value of news reporting an open 
question: then, as now, it was relatively easy to steal the news, or even to fake it. 
Given the limited size of the newspaper market and the impunity with which news could be 
copied, it should come as no surprise that news agencies devoted much attention to protecting 
their reporting. Some tried to exclude rivals altogether; others to cut deals with government 
administrators to obtain exclusive access to official dispatches. To gain control over the market, 
Reuters, Havas, and Wolff formed a global cartel in 1870 that the Associated Press would 
eventually join. Henceforth, each was responsible for reporting on and circulating to each other 
whatever news they might have discovered on their particular "beat" (Silberstein-Loeb 2014). 
Not everyone found this arrangement to its liking. Troubled by the global news cartel, and 
eager to tell its own story, the Japanese government in the 1930s entered into an agreement with 
cable network provider Great Northern (Akami 2012). The Japanese government's desire for 
autonomy in news provisioning hastened the departure from the global news cartel of the AP. 
Not until after World War II would the Japanese government give up its dream of a "Greater 
East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere" that was independent of First World control (Yang 2010; 
Akami 2014). 
Even more radical in his critique of the global news cartel was the Indian journalist and polit-
ical activist Mahatma Gandhi. What was the ethical value, Gandhi asked during his years in 
South Africa, of the rapid transmission of up-to-date news? To answer this question, Gandhi 
founded a newspaper that championed an alternative ethic of slow reading (Hofineyr 2013). 
After returning to India, Gandhi helped to transform the telegraph into "a double-edged sword" 
(Headrick 2010). Although the British had assumed the new media would consolidate British 
imperial control, Gandhi and his fellow Indian nationalists deployed it to counterbalance 
English-language reporting, challenge First World-style economic development, and coordinate 
pan-Indian resistance to British imperialism (Bonea 2016). 
News agencies adapted to the advent of radio broadcasting in the 1920s in various ways. In 
Great Britain and Germany, the government regulated broadcasting tightly and radio stations 
were funded primarily by licensing fees. In both countries, news agencies at first provided the 
limited news sent- over the airwaves. Only in the 1930s would the British government-licensed 
radio broadcaster, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), begin to invest in an inde-
pendent news-gathering apparatus (Tworek 2015b). The Soviet news agency, TASS, provided 
news for radio too, but radio in the Soviet Union was broadcast publicly through loudspeakers 
(Lovell 2015), rather than in private homes - the norm in Great Britain, Germany, and the 
United States. 
In countries such as Argentina, news agencies sold news to advertising-based stations for 
producers intent on creating "authentically" Argentine programs for the working class (Kamsh 
2012). Radio broadcasting in the United States was even more emphatically commercial. From 
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the beginning, news agencies provided domestic radio stations with news, which they broadcast 
in the hopes of catching advertising dollars. 
International broadcasting, by contrast, operated under different rules. Each of the principal 
U.S. overseas broadcast networks - Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberty 
- were government owned and government operated (Puddington 2015). To prevent overseas 
news broadcasts from competing with domestic news broadcasts, lawmakers in 1948 prohibited 
the overseas networks from broadcasting inside the United States. The U.S. overseas networks 
confronted a different kind of obstacle from the government of the Soviet Union and its satel-
lites. To prevent their broadcasts from penetrating the Iron Curtain, the Soviet government 
grew adept at blocking, or ''jamming," their transmission (Siefert 2003). 
The rapid dismantling of the European colonial empires following World War II confronted 
news agencies with additional challenges. Troubled by the continuing dominance in the global 
news market of news agencies headquartered in First World countries such as the United States 
and Great Britain, a coalition of Third World countries joined a group of left-leaning First 
World academics to establish a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) 
under the auspices of the United Nations Economic, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) (Brendebach 2018). In protest, both the United States and Great Britain briefly 
boycotted the UN organization. 
In hindsight, it would seem indisputable that NWICO failed. Though the commercialization 
of the Internet has substantially transformed the global informational environment, the global 
influence of First World news agencies remains substantial. Ironically, several African nations 
received more news from Reuters after decolonization than they had during the colonial era, 
since Reuters squeezed out its Francophone rivals and pan-African cooperation stalled (Brennan 
2015). Decolonization did not foster a new generation of post-colonial news agencies; instead, 
it consolidated a legacy news agency that was closely linked to the British Empire. 
Newcomers such as Qatar-based Al Jazeera, China Central TV (CCTV), and Russia-based 
RT and Sputnik have tried to push back against what they regard as Anglo-American domi-
nance of global news, thus far with limited success. Even so, the insurgents persist. "The ratings 
are almost beside the point" noted a New York Times reporter, in commenting on a Russian 
state-funded media project intended for viewers in the United States. What matters, declared 
Russian president Vladimir Putin, in a remarkably frank statement of his government's media 
policy, is to "break the monopoly of Anglo-Saxon global information streams," a policy goal 
that raises troubling moral questions in an age when the "weaponizing" of social media by 
foreign governments and multinational organizations is shaping popular culture and influencing 
electoral outcomes (Rutenberg 2017). 
The dominant global communications organizations today are different in many ways from 
those that thrived in the nineteenth century. Yet they too have benefitted from path-dependent 
processes that owe as much to politics and culture as to technology and economics. For this 
reason, the organizations featured in this chapter - the cable companies that circulated informa-
tion between the world's major commercial centers; the news agencies that created the content 
for the world's newspapers and broadcasters; and the postal and telecommunications networks 
that connected the world's peoples - created path-dependent institutional structures that have 
proved remarkably resistant to change. 
How global communications will evolve in the future is an open question. Much will 
depend on the future configuration of the Internet, and, in particular, on the changing struc-
ture of the market for long-distance point-to-point communicatiom (B:ilbi 2013). For much 
of the twentieth century, most of the world's telephone service was operated either as a 
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government monopoly (which often combined the post, the telegraph, and the telephone in 
a single organization, and for this reason were known as PTTs) or, as in the United States, by 
a tightly regulated private firm, AT&T. The Bell System, a:> AT&T was known until its 1984 
Supreme Court ordered break-up, operated primarily in the United States. Y ct it abo oper-
ated as an equipment manufacturer, Western Electric, that in the early years of telephony 
moved rapidly into global markets, as well as a research and development laboratory - Bell 
Labs - that developed a raft of innovations that would shape global communications, includ-
ing the transistor, fiber optics, and cellular telephony. 
Since 1970, the provisioning of telephone service has been unbundled, leading to a veritable 
explosion in foreign investment in networks that had formerly been government monopolies. 
This was true not only in Europe, but also in the Global South. Forty percent of all private 
investment in telecommunications in developing countries in 2000 came from overseas, mostly 
from incumbent providers in search of new markets. In fact, of the 100 largest nonfinancial 
transnational corporations in 2002, no fewer than eight were in telecommunications. Interest-
ingly, each of these companies had formerly been a nationally based monopoly telecommuni-
cations service provider: six in Europe, one in Asia, and one in the United States {United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2004: 117, 276-278). 
Foreign investment by telecommunications corporations is nothing new. The U.S. tele-
phone equipment manufacturer Western Electric opened a factory in Antwerp in 1882; the 
German cable manufacturer Siemens & Halske operated ten factories in five foreign countries 
in 1914, including China (Fitzgerald 2015: 128-132); the Swedish telephone equipment manu-
facturer Ericsson built one-third of its equipment outside Sweden in the 1930s Qones 2005: 
105). Direct foreign investment in telephone operating companies became increasingly precari-
ous following World War II, as several governments took control of networks that had previ-
ously been operated by multinationals (Wilkins 1998: 117; Bucheli and Salvaj 2014). Even so, 
multinationals continued to supply much of the world's telephone equipment. The post-1970 
period is distinguished, instead, by an increased reliance on outsourcing as an alternative to in-
house manufacturing. In the period since 2000, for example, Ericsson, which in that year was 
the largest telecommunications corporations in the world, has reduced its foreign direct invest-
ments in manufacturing from seventy plants to fewer than ten (Fitzgerald 2015: 489). 
Variegated and rapidly evolving- hastened, in particular, by the collapse of the once formid-
able technical barrier between digital computing and analog communications - these organiza-
tions are better characterized as network service providers than as large-scale technical systems. 
Privatization has fostered rapid innovation: of the ten largest mobile telephone operators in 
Africa in 2006, five were headquartered in Europe (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development 2008: 111). The results of this unbundling are evident to anyone who has visited 
Kenya, India, or China: mobile telephony has boomed. 
Today's global communications network providers are among the leading beneficiaries of 
this post-1970 restructuring of the world's information infrastructure. This restructuring is often 
termed "deregulation," "liberalization," or even "neoliberalism," implying that governments 
no longer play a critical role in the informational environment of the digital age. 
Nothing could be further from the truth. Government support has been instrumental not 
only in the promulgation of the technical standards that undergird the Internet (Russell 2014), 
but also in the scientific advances that made possible the Apple iPhone (Mazzucato 2013). Tax 
policy has shaped the location of brick-and-mortar facilities. The European Union has saddled 
Apple with huge fines for anti-competitive practices. A 1996 U.S. federal law immunized digital 
platforms from prosecution for the circulation of false, malicious, or libelous information; this 
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work closely with network providers to surveil network users and to block subversive, obscene, 
or fake information (Tworek 2017). 
What has changed is the scale on which these organizations operate. The markets in which 
Apple, Google, Facebook, Tencent, Nokia, and their rivals compete today are global rather 
than nationwide, making them in certain ways the heir to the undersea cable companies and 
news agencies of the past. New institutional arrangements abound. Facebook and Google, for 
example, are investing in fiber optic cables, a development reminiscent of the funding of a new 
Atlantic cable by the late-nineteenth-century newspaper baron James Gordon Bennett, Jr. More 
than any other factor, global competition between mobile telephone providers has hastened the 
quantitatively unprecedented expansion in connectivity on every continent, enabling billions of 
people to communicate at a remarkably low cost by email, voice, or even video with friends and 
relatives anywhere in the world. 
This restructuring of the informational environment, in turn, opens up new possibilities for 
historical research. While we know a great deal about nineteenth-century undersea cables and 
pre-World War II news agencies, we know relatively little about the origins of today's fiber 
optic network and even less about the long history of global broadcasting, global censorship, and 
global surveillance. The significance of these phenomena is self-evident now that the relation-
ship between global communications networks and the nation-state has become a topic of 
considerable contemporary concern. The recent spectacular rise of Google, Facebook, and 
Tencent also raises a spate of public-policy questions about the relationship between MNEs and 
the public good. If, for example, a digital platform can obtain a dominant market share in a 
media market by capitalizing on what economists call "network effects" - that is, the propensity 
of a network to become more valuable to its users as it expands - might not its very success 
become a rationale for its regulation? 
The dizzying recent changes in global communications underscore the relevance of political 
economy as an analytical lens. Communications infrastructure is enormously expensive, giving 
the organizations that own and operate the world's communications networks and Internet 
service providers a vested interest in political stability. Convendy, the absence of political 
stability-as, for example, during World Wars I and II, or the early yean of decolonization - has 
been enormously disruptive, with unpredictable consequences that have often proved 
irreversible. 
Nothing is permanent. It is for this reason salutary to remember that influential elites have 
previously predicted that rapid, high-speed, global communications would bring economic 
prosperity and world peace. Writing in 1912, German economics professor Bernhard Harms 
hailed the "electrical transmission of news" as a more important factor in hastening oveneas 
trade than even the steamship or the railway (Harms 1912: 141). Influential progressives in 
Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, and the United States went even further, contending 
that the world had become so interconnected that a global conflagration had become 
inconceivable. 
The visionaries were mistaken. In 1914 - and once again in 1939 - the war came. Even m, 
the seductive allure of the profoundly mistaken assumption that technical advance will inexor-
ably hasten moral progress endures - as anyone can attest who lived through the Internet boom 
of the 1990s. Paradoxes abound. International stability has never been more essential, yet diplo-
macy is disparaged. Information is ubiquitous, yet disinformation is endemic. Maintenance has 
never been more indispensable, yet disruptive innovation hall the rage. Never has the power of 
political economy to shape the institutional rules of the game been more palpable. yet rarely has 
the effects of these institutional arrangements been more emphatically denied. For if the history ,, 
recounted in this chapter holds any lessons for the future, it is that the huge organizations that 
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dominate today'~ global communications networks are driven l~s by technologial imperatives 
than their champiom proclaim, and arc more dependent on political fiat than all but their most 
inveterate critics concede (Price 2002). 
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